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Abstract—The widespread use of intelligent mobile phone
has promoted prosperity of mobile App advertising in recent
years. Based on existing bidding status, this paper presents
the dominant bidding strategy for mobile advertising auction.
Firstly, our study characterizes multiple Nash Equilibria
resulting from diﬀerent bidding strategies in wGSP (weighted
Generalized Second-Price) auction. Further more, we prove
that advertiser’s rank and utility will not decrease by using the
dominant bidding strategy. We also consider the situation where
the reserve price is set by the mobile advertising platform. It
turns out that that advertiser’s payment will be no less than
reserve price. Finally, a practical implementation for a virtual
market simulates the dynamic bidding process in real world
environments.
Keywords : Mobile App Advertising Auction, wGSP mecha-
nism, Nash Equilibrium, Dominant Bidding Strategy.
I. Introduction
The increasing of mobile communication equipments has
spurred the growth of all kinds of intelligent systems. We
can compare the price of goods, download games and browse
commodities whenever and wherever. With popular game
Plants vs. Zombies creating astonishing record, more and
more advertisers promote their brand on mobile App. App has
become key driving force of the current advertising market
and advertisers’ total spending for advertising on mobile App
will surpass 2.9 billion.
Compared with traditional internet advertising auction(i.e.
sponsored search auction), mobile advertising platform is the
intermediary between the App developer and the advertiser.
When a user use the App, the mobile App advertising platform
would provide suitable advertisements with certain auction
mechanism, such as GSP(Generalized-Second-Price) and
GFP(Generalized-First-Price). The position of advertisement
on the page decides how many clicks the advertisement
receives. The advertiser will pay limited price for user’s click.
This payment will be shared by platform and App developer.
Our research is based on the sponsored search auction.
However, being diﬀerent from the related literature [7] which
studied the behavior of advertisers and search engine in spon-
sored search auction, mobile advertising platform is between
advertisers and App developer in mobile App advertising
auction. Platform can be accurate to follow advertisement’s
geographical location, time, type, price, brand and previous
average click through rates. Thus, similar to Aggarwal G et
al. [8], we introduce the notion of weight which indicates
the eﬀect of those factors. Our mobile advertising auction
mechanism generally uses the wGSP (weighted Generalized-
Second-Price) mechanism.
Our contribution is to present the dominant bidding strategy
for mobile advertising auction. But our work is diﬀerent from
Bu T M et al. [4] whose forward looking response function do
not consider the weight. To be closer to the actual situation,
advertisers, in our paper, are ranked by the product of his/her
bid and weight. Another line of work closely related to ours
is [3] in which the author studied multiple Nash Equilibria.
We propose that multiple Nash Equilibria also exist in mobile
advertising auction. Moreover, our work take the reserve
price into account. The payment will be the maximum of the
previous payment and the reserve price. This change may
aﬀect the dominant bidding strategy.
The paper is structured as follows: next we discuss the
related literatures. Section III introduces the basic deﬁnitions,
properties and formally describes the mobile advertising auc-
tion model. In Section IV, we ﬁrstly analyse the existence of
multiple Nash Equilibria that satisfy the wGSP mechanism.
Then, we propose the dominant bidding strategy with or
without reserve price. Additionally, a practical implementation
for a virtual market is presented to conﬁrm the dominant
bidding strategy. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Related Work
Because of the growing popularity of GSP (Generalized
Second-Price) mechanism, this problem has attracted intensive
studies in recent years. Renato G et al. [10] develop a Bayes-
Nash analysis of the generalized second-price (GSP) auction,
their results characterizes the eﬃcient Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the GSP and provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition
that guarantees existence of such an equilibrium. Baichun
Xiao et al. [9] proposed sponsored search advertising model,
which was widely used by most web search engines such as
Google, Yahoo. [5], [6] pointed out “locally-free equilibrium”,
when the GSP auction achieved Nash Equilibrium. This notion
could be extended to “global envy free equilibrium”. Namely,
none of the auction participants is willing to suﬀer a deﬁcit.
Thus, paper [1] put forward that GSP mechanism must satisfy
individual rationality, which means that the price can’t exceed
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value of the advertisements.
The related literature on bidding strategy has also been
growing. Y. Kamijo. [2] explores the bidding behavior of
advertisers in a sealed-bid environment, where each bidder
does not know the current bids of others. It is shown that
the SBT(secure bidding with a trial) bid adjustment process
converges to some equilibrium point in a one-shot game
irrespective of the initial bid proﬁle. [11] presented an
intelligent advertiser for bidding on CPC(Cost Per Click)
sponsored search auctions. The advertiser developed a future
look-ahead bidding plan that enabled it to hold back cash for
more desirable times of the day. Cary M et al. [12] considered
best-response bidding strategies for a repeated auction. Zhou
Y et al. [13] showed that vindictive bidding was prevalent in
sponsored search auctions, and it led to instability of most
traditional Nash Equilibrium.
III. The Model
A. Basic settings
In this section, we will explain the basic deﬁnition and the
mobile advertising auction model. Our payment rule is CPC
(Cost Per Click). It essentially means that advertisers will pay
when a user clicks on their advertisements. In the mobile
App advertising auction environment, assume n risk-neutral
advertisers compete for k (n ≥ k) slots inside the mobile App.
Formally, a bid submitted by advertiser i is denoted by bi. wi
represents advertiser i’s weight which is assigned by mobile
Ad platform. Advertisers are ranked by the product of his/her
bid and weight wi (i.e.wibi). If advertiser i got j-th highest
position among k slots, his payment per click will be pi(k, j),
which is deﬁned as
pi(k, j) =
w( j+1)b( j+1)
wi
(1)
where ( j) denotes the bidder who gets slot j. For any two slots
(m < l), wmb(m) ≥ wlb(l) holds.
Advertisers’ bids constitute the bid vector
b = (b1, b2, ..., bn). xi, j(b) represents the probability of
advertiser i who gets slot j. Each advertiser can be allocated
to one slot at most and each slot can be allocated to one
advertiser at most, too. It can be represented as:
n∑
i=1
xi, j(b) ≤ 1 (2)
k∑
j=1
xi, j(b) ≤ 1 (3)
Moreover, each advertiser i has a privately known information
vi which represents the expected return of per-click to adver-
tiser i. For simplicity, we assume that all the bidders’ private
values would be always diﬀerent. qi is a factor related to the
quality of advertiser i. Let αi, j denote click-through rate of
advertiser i who got j-th slot among k slots. And it is deﬁned
as follows:
αi, j = e j qi (4)
where e j denotes the impact of slot j. There is αi,1 > αi,2 >
...αi,k for the same advertiser.
We introduce the following ﬁve properties for mobile ad-
vertising auction:
Risk neutral: Each advertiser’s target in the auction is to
maximize their expected utility;
Private value: Only advertiser himself knows true value which
is private information;
Independent: The advertiser’s value v1, ..., vn is independent
random variables;
Symmetry: True value is the same probability distribution
from a continuous random variables i.e. F(v);
Individual rationality: Payment of each advertiser can’t ex-
ceed value, otherwise advertiser will quit.
Assume v1 > v2 >, ..., > vn. Then, the necessary conditions
for Nash Equilibrium is
• if n ≤ k,
w(1)b(1) > w(2)b(2) >, ...,w(n)b(n)
• if n > k,
w(1)b(1) > w(2)b(2) >, ...,w(k)b(k) > w(k+1)b(k+1)
Particularly, for ∀i < j and w(i)b(i) = w( j)b( j), advertiser i will
be assigned above advertiser j.
B. Utility of Advertiser
Given bid vector b, the expected click through rate of
advertiser i is deﬁned as
Qi(b) =
k∑
j=1
xi, j(b)αi, j (5)
The expected payment of advertiser i is represented as
follows:
Pi(b) =
k∑
j=1
xi, j(b)αi, j pi(k, j) (6)
Thus, the utility of advertiser i can be represented as:
ui(b) =
k∑
j=1
xi, j(b)αi, j(vi − pi(k, j))
= viQi(b) − Pi(b) (7)
IV. Analysis
A. Multiple Equilibria in Mobile App Advertising Auction
1) Envy-free Equilibrium: If there is 1 ≤ s < a < t ≤ k and
(8),(9), we say that this equilibrium is envy-free.
αi,a(vi − w(a+1)b(a+1)wi )
≥ αi,s(vi − w(s+1)b(s+1)wi ) (8)
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αi,a(vi − w(a+1)b(a+1)wi )
≥ αi,t(vi − w(t+1)b(t+1)wi ) (9)
2) Nash Equilibria Algorithm: While some advertisers
adopt diﬀerent bidding strategies, they still get the same
allocation in equilibrium. We call these Nash Equilibria “E-
quivalence Class”. For the purpose of calculating the number
of Equivalence Classes, we design the Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm of Nash equilibria
Input: Diﬀerent kinds of bidding vector
Output: The number of Nash Equilibria
1: Set m = 0;
2: Select bidding vector, determine the allocation;
3: Determine whether it is the diﬀerent equivalence class;
4: if It is the same then
5: go to step (2);
6: end if;
7: if It is the diﬀerent then
8: go on;
9: end if;
10: if The bid vector satisfy Nash Equilibrium (all advertisers
satisfy global envy free equilibrium) then
11: go on;
12: end if;
13: if The bid vector satisfy Nash Equilibrium (all advertisers
satisfy global envy free equilibrium) then
14: go to step (2);
15: end if;
16: go on;
17: m← m + 1, go to step(2).
According to permutation and combination, we can get the
number of equivalence classes. If n ≤ k holds, the number will
be n! at most. Otherwise, the number will be k!+(n−k)(k−1)!
at most.
B. Dominant Bidding Strategy for Advertiser
1) Without Considering the Reserve Price: Mobile adver-
tising auction allows advertisers to change their bids anytime.
Once some bids are changed, platform will refresh the rank
automatically and instantaneously. All the bidders’ rank and
utility will also be recalculated. Other advertisers can then
have incentive to change their bids to increase their utility.
While other advertisers respond to his/her bid, he/she must
change bid once again to get the higher possible rank, ensuring
his/her utility does not reduce.
Lemma 1: For any t: t < s, the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for ui(k, s) ≤ ui(k, t) is
bi ≤ eset (vi −
w(s+1)b(s+1)
wi
) (10)
Proof: If advertiser i gets slot s, the expected utility will
be
ui(k, s) = (vi − w(s+1)b(s+1)wi )αi,s
If advertiser i gets slot t, the expected utility will be
ui(k, s) = (vi − w(t+1)b(t+1)wi )αi,t
When advertiser i gets slot t, wibi ≥ w(t+1)b(t+1) is satisﬁed.
Then, the utility of advertiser i at least is:
ui(k, t) = (vi − wiwi bi)αi,t
= (vi − bi)αi,t
bi ≤ vi − αi,s
αi,t
(αi,t)(vi − w(s+1)b(s+1)wi )
= vi − eset (vi −
w(s+1)b(s+1)
wi
)
Owing to t < s, we can get αi,s−1 ≤ αi,t,
b′i = vi −
es
es−1
(vi − w(s+1)b(s+1)wi ) (11)
≤ vi − eset (vi −
w(s+1)b(s+1)
wi
)
If the advertiser i’s bid is b′i and he/she gets slot t
′, it will be
obviously that t′ ≤ s and ui(k, s) ≤ ui(k, t′).
According to the above reasoning, we infer the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: Let b−i = (b1, ..., bi−1, bi+1, ..., bn) denote the
bids of all other bidders except i. If the rank of advertiser
i is s, the dominant bidding strategy for advertiser i is
Fi(b−i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
vi s = 1
vi s > k
vi − eses−1 (vi −
w(s+1)
wi
b(s+1)) 2 ≤ s ≤ k
(12)
Proof: First, let’s prove that the dominant bidding strategy
for advertiser i is an Nash Equilibrium strategy . According
to (12), we will have
qielb(s+1) = qi
k∑
j=s
(e j − e j+1)w( j+1)v( j+1)wi (13)
Advertiser i earns
ui(b) =
k∑
j=1
xi, j(b)αi, j(vi − pi(k, j))
= αi,s(vi − b(s+1))
= qi
k∑
j=s
(e j − e j+1)vi − qi
k∑
j=s
(e j − e j+1)w( j+1)v( j+1)wi
= qi
k∑
j=s
(e j − e j+1)(vi − w( j+1)v( j+1)wi ) (14)
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But, if advertiser i changes the bid to get slot φ (φ  s),
he/she will earns
ui(b)′ = qieφ(vi − b(φ+1))
= qi
k∑
j=φ
(e j − e j+1)(vi − w( j+1)v( j+1)wi ) (15)
For any φ > s, the net utility from this deviation is equal to
ui(b) = −qi
φ−1∑
j=s
(e j − e j+1)(vi − w( j+1)v( j+1)wi ) (16)
Since wibi > w(s+1)b(s+1) >, ..., > w(φ−1)b(φ−1), we know that
ui(b) < 0.
For φ < s, the net utility is equal to
ui(b)′ = qi
s−1∑
j=φ
(e j − e j+1)(vi − w( j+1)v( j+1)wi ) (17)
Since wibi < w(s−1)b(s−1) <, ..., < w(φ)b(φ), it is obviously that
ui(b)′ < 0. Hence, the deviation is not proﬁtable and strategy
Fi(b−i) is a Nash Equilibrium strategy.
Then, in this new created Nash Equilibrium, advertiser
i’s rank and utility will not decrease according to Lemma1.
Therefore, Fi(b−i) is advertiser i’s dominant bidding strategy.
2) Considering the Reserve Price: In order to guarantee the
utility of the App developer, mobile advertising platform may
set reserve price for each slot. Then, some advertisers whose
true value is lower than the reserve price may quit the auction.
If advertiser i gets slot j, the payment will be
pi(k, j) = max(
w( j+1)b( j+1)
wi
, r j) (18)
subject to vi ≥ r j
where r j denotes the reserve price of the slot j.
If advertiser i gets slot t (vi ≥ rt), the utility is
ui(k, t) = (vi − pi(k, t))αi,t (19)
where
pi(k, t) = max(
w(t+1)b(t+1)
wi
, rt)
According to wibi ≥ w(s+1)b(s+1), if there exists slot s (vi ≥
rs), the utility of advertiser i would be at least:
ui(k, s) = (vi − wiwi bi)αi,s = (vi − bi)αi,s
In order to ensure
ui(k, s) ≥ ui(k, t)
We obtain the following inequality:
(vi − pi(k, t))αi,t ≤ (wiwi bi)αi,s
= (vi − bi)αi,s
bi ≤ vi − etes (vi −max(
w(t+1)b(t+1)
wi
, rt) (20)
Then, we get the following corollary:
Corollary 1: If the rank of advertiser i is t and the reserve
price of slot t is rt, the dominant bidding strategy for advertiser
i is as follows:
Gi(b−i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
vi t = 1
vi t > k
vi − etet−1 (vi − max(
w(t+1)
wi
b(t+1), rt) 2 ≤ t ≤ k
(21)
Proof: If pi(k, t) =
w(t+1)
wi
b(t+1) ≥ rt, the reserve price would
have no eﬀect on the bidding strategies . Therefore, bidding
strategy for advertiser i is the same with (12). Otherwise,
advertiser i should compare the payment with reserve price.
C. Practical implementation for a virtual market
We implemented the dominant bidding strategy for a vir-
tual market. This subsection demonstrates the result of this
implementation.
The initial data is as TABLE I:
TABLE I
Initial Parameters
n = 3 k = 2

v1 = 5 v2 = 4.5 v3 = 1
w1 = 3 w2 = 3 w3 = 1.5
α1,1 = 0.2 α1,2 = 0.1

α2,1 = 0.2 α2,2 = 0.1

b1 = 2 b2 = 3 b3 = 1
Because all advertisers have no incentive to change the bid
in this state, Nash Equilibrium exists for the above bidding
strategies. If advertiser 1 changes the bid to b′1 based on the
dominant bidding strategy. i.e.
b′1 = v1 −
α1,2
α1,1
(v1 − w3b3w1 )
= 5 − 0.1
0.2
(5 − 1.5
3
)
= 2.75
Then,
u′2(2, 1) = (v2 −
w1b′1
w2
) × α2,1
= (4 − 2.75 × 3
3
) × 0.2
= 0.25
For u′2(2, 1) < u2(2, 1), advertiser 2 must get slot 2 by reducing
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bid. Then,
u′′1 (2, 1) = (v1 −
w2b′2
w1
) × α1,1
= (5 − 6
3
) × 0.2
= 0.6
u′′2 (2, 2) = (v2 −
w3b3
w3
) × α2,2
= (4 − 1.5
3
) × 0.2
= 0.35
If advertiser 3 get slot 1 or 2, advertiser 1 or 2 will increase
bid. So advertiser 3 can not get advertising slot and his utility
is 0.
TABLE II shows that bidder 2 has to decrease the bid to
get the optimal utility when bidder 2 changes the bid. After
simulating this bidding process for the virtual market, a new
created Nash Equilibrium exists.
As we expected, both advertiser 1’s utility and the slot
increase, comparing with the initial state.
TABLE II
variety of parameters

Previous bidding After adjusted bidding
b1 2 2.75
b2 3 1.5
b3 1 1
u1 0.45 0.6
u2 0.4 0.35
u3 0 0
Rank of advertiser 1 2 1
Rank of advertiser 2 1 2
Rank of advertiser 3 3 3
The results of our implementation for the virtual market
presented in this subsection shows that the dominant bidding
strategy will work in real world environments.
V. Conclusion
This paper discusses two major problems in mobile advertis-
ing auction − multiple Nash Equilibria and dominant bidding
strategy. This paper ﬁrstly designs a new mobile advertising
auction model, in which mobile advertising platform allocates
slots to advertisers considering weight. After providing exis-
tence of multiple Nash Equilibria, an algorithm for calculating
the number of “Equivalence Class” is presented. Then, we
put forward dominant bidding strategy. The objective of this
bidding strategy is to increase advertiser’s rank and the utility,
comparing with the previous status. At last, the results of
implementation for the virtual market presented shows that
the dominant bidding strategy will work in real world envi-
ronments.
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